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I will quickly summarize the aim and views of my article before addressing the various issues 
raised by the commentaries. The overall aim of the article is to give a very general outline of a 
novel semantics of sentences involving intensional expressions, such as attitude verbs, 
modals, intensional transitive verbs, based on a novel ontology of attitudinal, modal and 
intensional objects, entities like claims, judgments, assumptions, hopes, beliefs, decisions 
(attitudinal objects), obligations, permissions, laws, possibilities, and abilities (modal objects)  
and purchases, debts, and searches (intensional objects).  Attitudinal objects are cognitive 
particulars and thus differ from propositions, abstract entities that are shareable truthberarers 
and meanings of sentences, the central ingredients of the standard relational analysis of 
attitude reports on which propositional attitudes are relations between agents and 
propositions. The focus of the paper are the motivations of the novel ontology with its 
connection to truthmaking and the overall semantics of sentences with attitude verbs, modals 
and intensional transitive verbs based on that ontology. The scope of the paper was limited of 
course; in particular, the paper did not elaborate a compositional semantics and clarify the 
syntactic structures taken to be input to semantic interpretation. 
     The use of the aforementioned ontology lead to a novel semantics of attitude reports, 
modal sentences and sentences with intensional transitive verbs. In particular, that-clauses 
(and ‘sentential units’ in general) are, on the proposed semantics, no longer treated as 
referential terms referring to propositions, but rather, semantically, as predicates of attitudinal 
or modal objects. They act that way by specifying (partially) the truthmaking conditions or 
2 
 
more generally satisfaction conditions of attitudinal and modal objects. The logical form of 
the attitude report in (1a) is then as in (1b) and the one of the modal sentence (2a) as in (2b), 
where ‘[S](d)’ means that the content of S is a partial content of d:
1
, 
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(1) a. John assumed that the door was open. 
     b. ed(assume(e, John) & [that the door was open](d) & d = att-obj(e)) 
(2) a. John needs to leave. 
     b. d(need(d) & [John to leave](d)) 
 
(1b) makes use of Davidsonian event semantics and a function att-obj mapping an event e to 
the attitudinal object associated with e. Using Davidsonian event semantics in (1b) was 
motivated in part in order to stay within mainstream semantics (with its numerous 
applications of event semantics), in part because it allows an easy way of introducing 
attitudinal objects. Attitudinal objects are generally associated with mental or illocutionary 
events, and some of them are (non-material) products of (cognitive or illocutionary) acts, in 
the sense of Twardowski’s distinction between ‘actions’ and ‘products’. A claim thus is the 
non-material product of an act of claiming and a decision a non-physical product of an act of 
deciding.       
      This semantics of attitude reports was in part based on earlier work which endorsed the 
following views:  
[1] That-clauses do not act as referential terms and as arguments of predicates. 
[2] Special quantifiers (something, everything) and special pronouns (that, what) stand for 
attitudinal objects or kinds of them when they are complements of attitude verbs. 
[3] The notion of an abstract proposition raises serious problems, in particular the problems of 
the truthdirectedness and of the unity of the proposition as well as the problem of how 
propositions can be grasped. 
With [1] the approach is not alone. The view of clauses not being referential terms, but rather 
predicates of content bearers has been pursued recently also by Kent Bach, Kratzer, Moulton, 
and Elliott. With [3], likewise, the approach is in company, in particular, with the critiques of 
                                                            
1 In the paper, the logical form of (1a) was given as (i), which is equivalent to (1b) if less conspicuous regarding 
the role of attitudinal objects for which the variable ‘d’ was used: 
 
(i) e(assume(e, John) & [that S]( att-obj(e))) 
 
2 The semantics of sentences with intensional transitive verbs such as look for  is different: with them the 
nominal complement has a function of characterizing ‘variable satisfiers’ of intensional objects. 
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abstract propositions by Soames, Hanks and others, who recently have pursued act-based 
conceptions of propositions instead. 
    The main idea of the proposed semantics is that attitudinal, modal and intensional objects 
with their truthmaking or satisfaction conditions play a central role for the semantics of 
sentences with intensional predicates. There are still different ways in which the semantics 
can be developed further, regarding [1] the exact semantic role of the complement of the 
intensional predicate, [2] a possible relation to Davidsonian events, and [3] the syntactic 
structure taken to be input to interpretation.   
      The background of the semantics is natural language ontology, which is based on the view 
that the ontology reflected in natural language, just like the ontology reflected in our ordinary 
judgments, is not to be considered an ontology of the fundamental, but rather an ontology 
involving a wealth of derivative entities. Ultimately, those entities may, at least in part, be 
explained in terms of what is fundamental, but for the purpose of the semantics of natural 
language it is important to be guided by the relevant linguistic and non-intuitions only, rather 
than assumptions regarding what there ultimately is.
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      The commentaries touch on a great range of issues, concerning the ontology of attitudinal, 
modal, and intensional objects, the syntactic basis of the proposed semantics, the semantic 
role of clausal complements, and the connection between propositional attitudes and modals. I 
will address those in turn. 
 
1. The ontology of attitudinal, modal, and intensional objects 
 
1.1. The nature of attitudinal, modal and intensional objects and artifacts 
 
Attitudinal, modal and intensional objects form an ontological category that is sharply 
distinguished from the more familiar categories of events (states and acts) and from 
propositions. In this reply I will call attitudinal, modal and intensional i-objects for short.   
I-objects are characterized by a range of types of properties that jointly distinguish them from 
other categories of entities. In particular, attitudinal, modal and intensional objects exhibit 
three types of content-related properties: having truth- or satisfaction conditions, entering 
similarity relations based on shared content only, and having only a part structure based on 
partial content. In addition, i–objects generally display some properties of concreteness, such 
                                                            
3 See Moltmann (2020) for more on the methodology of natural language ontology. 
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as having a potentially limited existence in time, entering causal relations, in some cases 
being perceivable. As such, i-objects are extremely well-reflected in natural language, in 
nouns corresponding to attitudinal and modal predicates and intensional transitive verbs, in 
the semantics of special quantifiers and pronouns such as something, that, and what, and, 
even, it appears, in the syntax of clausal complement constructions. But i-objects do not 
strictly depend on natural language. For example, laws are modal objects too. Also our 
intuitions about thoughts, beliefs, assertions, intentions, decisions and judgments are not 
strictly driven by language.   
     Adopting attitudinal objects as an ontological category that is at the center of the semantics 
of attitude reports contrasts with the standard view on which the semantics of attitude reports 
involves propositions instead and perhaps events. Making use of attitudinal objects avoids 
notorious problems for abstract propositions since attitudinal objects are cognitive particulars 
that, by their very nature, can be grasped and are able to represent and be truth evaluable. It 
also avoids forcing events into a content-bearing role, which, as Davis’ commentary 
emphasizes, is counterintuitive.  
      The paper adopts the view that i-objects generally are the only denotations of (non-
gerundive) nouns corresponding to intensional predicates such as belief and claim. This view 
contrasts with the standard linguistic view, which generally posits a polysemy of nouns like 
belief and claim, standing either for an event or state or for a proposition. Properties of 
concreteness, on that view, go with the event denotation; properties relating to content with 
the proposition denotation.   
     Ramchand in her commentary takes the apparent polysemy to be the same as the one that 
arises for artifacts that come with a physical realization, that is, books, proofs, letters, 
arguments etc.  She points out, that the apparent polysemy is far-reaching and moreover, 
surprisingly stable across languages. There do not seem to be any languages that distinguish 
the event-reading and the proposition-reading morphologically. Ramchand prefers to take this 
to be indicate a universal of conceptualization. But it can equally be considered support for an 
ontological view of certain types of artifacts that by nature display both properties of 
concreteness and of content (or come with two facets: a content-related facet and a physical 
facet). 
    The apparent distinction between content-objects and physical objects in the case of 
artifacts such as books and arguments is not quite the same, though, as the distinction between 
attitudinal objects and the events, acts or states they are associated with. Books and arguments 
with their physical and content-related facets are products of acts, acts of writing and arguing 
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(and writing down). By contrast, the apparent ambiguity of claim and request is that between 
an act of claiming or requesting and a product, the claim or request.  
     Unlike what Davis state in his commentary, t he action-product distinction is not just a 
distinction between an action and its material product, but includes the distinction between an 
act and a product that lacks a material realization, such as the distinction between declaring or 
passing a law and the law (a modal products). This has been the chief insight underlying 
Twardowski’s (1912) distinction between actions and products.
 4
 The same action-product 
distinction then applies also to the distinction between a thinking and a thought and a judging 
and a judgment, with products that lack a physical realization. Products like claims and 
requests lack a material realization, but still have a physical realization. 
 
In the case of books, 
we have products that have a material realization. 
     The action-product distinction does not cover all attitudinal, modal or intensional objects. 
Thus, it does not apply to state-related attitudinal objects such as beliefs and intentions, which 
need not have been produced by an act, and it does not apply to conclusions, which are 
‘reached’, rather than ‘made’ (produced by an act of concluding). Here the attitudinal object 
has the status of a result, rather than an intended product.
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    The use of modal objects yields a novel account of modal sentences allowing for a range of 
new conceptual options. One important application of the ontology of modal objects is the 
distinction between strong and weak permissions and obligations, a distinction that arguably 
extends to other modals as well.  Strong permissions, roughly permissions that have been 
given explicitly, involve the product of an illocutionary act, with a highly restricted set of 
satisfiers (actions exactly satisfying the permission given). Weak (or implicit) permissions 
involve a modal object that is individuated differently, in relation to what is obligatory, setting 
up a duality with obligations. The difference, the paper suggested, is reflected in two sorts of 
modal predicates as below, with the nominalization in (3b) involving explicit reference to a 
modal object: 
 
(3) a. John is permitted to leave.  (weak and strong reading) 
     b. John has permission to leave. (strong reading only) 
 
                                                            
4 See also the discussion in Moltmann  (2017a)  in connection with works of art and  Amy Thomasson’s notion 
of an ‘abstract artifact’. Davis also says that the relation between a claiming and a claim cannot be understood as 
a causal relation (which is not said in the paper or elsewhere in my previous work). Whether the relation between 
an action and its product / the artifact it produces it is to be understood as a causal relation is another matter. 
 
5 Implicit beliefs, in particular, are hardly established by an act, let alone  a state, pace Davis. 
6 
 
Arsenijevic, who adopts the standard ontology of events and propositions, argues that the 
difference between (3a) and (3b) can be explained in terms of the involvement of an act in 
(3b), but not in (3a), citing the strong reading of (4): 
 
(4) John was permitted to leave. 
 
He takes the strong reading to be due to the (somewhat doubtful) eventive nature of have in 
(3b) and was in (3c).  Certainly, the involvement of an act is relevant also on the present view: 
strong permissions are taken to be products of acts, but not weak permissions, and past tense 
as in (4) is suggestive of the act having taken place, thus triggering a strong reading. 
However, it appears that event involvement cannot generally be responsible for a strong 
reading. Thus (4a), which does not involve an eventive verb, allows only for a strong reading, 
as opposed to (5b), which allows both a strong and a weak reading: 
 
(5) a. Mary appreciates the permission to leave. 
     b. Mary appreciates being permitted to leave. 
 
This then motivates just a weakening of the generalization of the paper: a strong reading is 
strictly tied to the nominalization, whereas the simple predicate allows for both readings 
depending on context. Note that the two readings have long been recognized for modal 
auxiliaries can and must, where no reference to an event is made. 
      Kaufmann points out that the distinction between weak and strong permissions generalizes 
to teleogical modality, where the strong cases would be ‘strategies’ (‘a possibility of opening 
the bottle’ is an example).  She suggests that strategies may have violators, in particular if all 
alternatives have been eliminated, and the remaining strategy becomes a ‘necessity’ for 
reaching the goal. She mentions that strategies come with other predicates of satisfaction than 
fulfill, accept, or realize, namely take on, pursue, or follow. Here are two replies to her point. 
First, strategies denoted by possibility come with different satisfaction predicates because they 
fail to be associated with a norm, unlike permissions and obligations, and they fail to have 
something like violators, unlike decisions and intentions (see the next section for more on 
that). Strategies represented as ‘possibilities’ certainly have no violators, but a commitment to 
pursue them, a second-level attitudinal object, has. When all other strategies have been 
eliminated, only the pursuit of one strategy allows reaching the goal. But this does not mean 
the strategy can be violated. It means that there are no other strategy that can be pursued. 
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Presenting it as a ‘necessity’, though, will have the pursuit of other strategies count as a 
violation.  
 
1.2. Attitudinal, modal and intensional objects and satisfaction conditions 
  
There is one type of property that distinguishes attitudinal objects from events and 
propositions particularly well, and that is the capacity to have truth conditions or more 
generally satisfaction conditions.  This was already one of the main motivations for 
Twardowski (1912) and, independently, Ulrich (1976) for positing a third category of objects 
distinct from abstract propositions and events. Attitudinal objects, like all i-objects, generally 
have truth or satisfaction conditions. There are different types of satisfaction predicates, and 
which one a particular i-object selects depends on its satisfaction conditions, its direction of fit 
as well as associated normative conditions (Moltmann 2018b). Thus, while the satisfaction 
predicates satisfy, comply with, fulfil, violate, and contravene apply to attitudinal objects  (and 
i-objects in general) that have both satisfiers and violators, satisfaction predicates like accept 
and take up apply to entities like offers or invitations, which have only satisfiers and no  
violators. Truth predicates (is true, is false) apply to attitudinal objects associated with a norm 
of correctness, namely truth (a claim or belief is correct just in case it is true) (word(mind) -
world direction of fit in the sense of Searle 1969, 1983); predicates of fulfilment (satisfy, 
violate) apply to attitudinal objects that impose a norm of correctness on their satisfiers 
(actions) (world–word(mind) direction of fit, in the sense of Searle 1969, 1983). Satisfaction 
predicates like realize, implement, execute apply to attitudinal objects of the sort of decisions 
and intentions, which do not involve a norm of correctness. The selection of satisfaction 
predicates is thus determined by the truthmaker- and norm-based nature of the attitudinal 
object. The conditions on the selection of satisfaction predicates by different attitudinal 
objects show the intimate connection between attitudinal and modal objects and truthmaking.
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       Davis in his commentary restricts his attention to attitudinal objects, adopting the 
standard view of propositions and events (states or acts) and endorsing a type-token 
distinction for the latter. Davis dismisses the motivation from satisfaction predicates arguing 
                                                            
6 This is one reason why truthmaking is not just added onto the ontology of attitudinal and modal objects, as 
suggested by Matthews in his commentary. Other reasons are the partial content that such objects display, a 
notion specifically made available by truthmaker semantics, the underspecification of content by some attitudinal 
objects, the potential dependency of truthmakers that are actions on the attitudinal object itself, as mentioned in 
the paper. 
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that satisfaction predicates are idiomatic when used with nominalizations of attitude verbs. 
His examples are break and keep, which when applied to NPs like John’s promise  are not 
used with their literal meaning, but obtain a special meaning which they have only in the 
presence of such nominalization. It is correct that attitudinal objects when referred to as 
‘(attitudinal) objects’ or even just ‘entities’ cannot be ‘broken’ or’ kept’ in the same sense as a 
‘promise’. One can add the observation that break and keep cannot act as satisfaction 
predicates with special quantifiers (*John promised something he would keep / break).
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However, that does not hold for the full range of satisfaction predicates applicable to 
attitudinal (and modal) objects: fulfill, satisfy, violate, accept apply to attitudinal and modal 
objects for which they are suited with their ordinary, non-derivative reading (and they can 
also apply to special quantifiers that way as in John promised something he could not fulfill). 
If predicates of satisfaction did not come with their own meaning when combining nouns for 
modal and attitudinal objects, then different sorts of attitudinal and modal objects would not 
be able to select different types of predicates depending on truthmaker-related and norm-
related conditions. 
     In the paper I have assumed that attitudinal and modal objects always come with 
truthmaking conditions. Liefke in her commentary proposes to separate truthmaking 
conditions from attitudinal objects for the purpose of the formal semantics. Instead of having 
a sentence S specify the satisfaction conditions of an attitudinal object d directly, that is, 
[S](d), we thus have fcont(d) = [S] for a function fcont mapping an attitudinal object to its 
content. There is indeed a question whether ‘expressive’ attitudinal objects, say sighs, 
appreciations, outbursts, have truthmaking conditions, and whether these should be 
considered attitudinal objects. But setting this issue aside, Liefke’s proposal of separating 
attitudinal objects from their content is associated with a serious difficulty, namely that it is 
unable to distinguish attitudinal objects of different forces (necessity and possibility). 
Attitudinal objects of necessity (e.g. claims, requests) have both satisfiers and violators; 
whereas attitudinal objects of possibility (e.g. proposals, offers) have only satisfiers and no 
violators. The truthmaker-based content of a sentence is a set of truthmakers and a set of 
falsitymakers, which thus could not be the content of an attitudinal object of possibility.
8
 
 
1.3. The ontological distinction between attitudinal objects and events and propositions 
                                                            
7 It is not clear that the derivative meaning of break is triggered by particular nouns. Break applies as a 
satisfaction predicate to laws and rules, however they are described. 
 
8 Liefke completely ignores falsitymakers of sentences and violators of attitudinal objects. 
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Some of the commentaries express doubts about the justification of attitudinal objects, in 
relation to propositions and events (and states) and have raised issues about the coherence of 
that ontology. Both David and Arsenijevic question content-based causation as a feature 
distinguishing attitudinal objects from the corresponding acts, arguing that the example given 
in the paper does not show that acts fail to engage in content-based causation. The example 
given in the paper (John claim that S caused an uproar vs. John’s making a claim caused an 
uproar) is indeed not a good one. However, there are better examples to make to make the 
point, examples not involving a clausal complement at all, as below:  
 
(4) a. John’s claim caused an uproar. 
      b. John’s speech act caused an uproar. 
(5) a. John’s talk / speech caused surprise. 
     b. John’s talking / speaking caused surprise. 
 
(4b) can hardly get a content-based causation reading, unlike (4a), and so for (5a) as opposed 
to (5b). (5) makes use of the contrast between simple nominalizations and gerunds, the kind of 
linguistic contrast that had motivated Twardowski’s distinction between actions and 
products.
9
  
    There is also the general question why the ontology of events and states should be preferred 
over that of attitudinal objects, aside from the fact that events and states are generally taken 
for granted. Being taken for granted does not mean that events and states are better 
understood than attitudinal objects. In fact, attitudinal objects seem to generally be more 
fundamental than states: the state of intending to leave is derivative upon the intention to 
leave, the state of knowing French is derivative upon the knowledge of French. Moreover, 
certain acts are individuated in terms of an attitudinal object, rather than the other way 
                                                            
9 Davis doubts other features distinguishing between states and attitudinal objects. Thus, states intuitively do not 
come with varying strengths, but state-related attitudinal objects do (John’s belief is stronger than Mary’s vs. ?? 
John’s believing that S is stronger than Mary’s believing that S) (which is not, as Davis suggests, a syntactic 
issue). Davis points out the acceptability of John believes S more strongly than Mary. This is indeed an issue if 
adverbials relate to Davidsonian events, and the events in this case are belief states. Let me briefly mention the 
available options without going into any detail. One option to pursue here is to take the Davidsonian event 
arguments of believe to be beliefs (attitudinal objects), rather than belief states. Yet another alternative is to take 
the Davidsonan event argument to be a concrete rather than an abstract state, following the distinction between 
concrete (Davidsonian) and abstract (Kimean) states (Maienborn 2007, Moltmann 2013b). Yet an alternative 
might be that strongly has a derivative meaning applying to the Davidsonian event argument, but targeting the 
associated attitudinal object, just as I argued truly in English does (Moltmann 2017a). 
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around: an act of concluding that S is derivative upon the conclusion that S and an act of 
persuading that S is derivative upon the persuasion that S.  
 
1.4. The coherence of the ontology 
 
Some commentators have raised general concerns about the ontology of attitudinal and modal 
objects, in particular whether attitudinal objects can really be particulars and whether the 
ontology attitudinal and modal objects is even coherent.  
  
1.4.1. The particularity of attitudinal objects 
 
Arsenijevic questions the particularity of attitudinal objects, citing an example (his 27) of the 
sort below, where John’s belief stands for a sharable, thus not a particular, object: 
 
(6) John’s belief that S is widespread. 
 
(6) is not actually a problem for the present view, though: attitudinal objects come in kinds, 
allowing for typical kind predicates such as widespread. Nominalizations such as belief 
generally are polysemous, denoting either particular attitudinal objects or kinds of them. 
Generally, terms for kinds of attitudinal objects are of the sort the belief that S. But the 
acceptability of examples of the sort in (6) would indicate that John’s belief that S may have 
that interpretation as well. More precisely, John’s belief that S would refer to a kind of 
attitudinal object had by John, which means a kind of attitudinal object that has an instance of 
which John is the agent. (6a) would thus be analysed along the lines of (6b): 
 
(6)  ιd[beliefkind(d) & HAVE(John, d) & widespread(d)] 
 
     Davis takes issue with my use of kinds of attitudinal objects: they would be on a par with 
propositions and would not inherit the properties of concreteness from particulars. This is not 
how they are conceived in the paper and preceding relevant work on attitudinal objects. 
Kinds, which are also reflected in bare plurals and mass nouns (such as giraffes and gold), 
inherit all their properties from actual or possible particulars that would be instances; in fact, 
in Moltmann (2013a) kinds are explicitly conceived as (modalized) pluralities of (actual and 
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possible) particulars. Widespread, in particular, expresses a property of kinds based on the 
spatial temporal location of particulars. 
      Arsenijevic presents a second, more challenging puzzle for the view of attitudinal objects 
as particulars. This is the behavior of state-related attitudinal nouns with that-clauses, which 
do not allow for the plural, thereby referring to different attitudinal objects:  
 
(7) seven beliefs that the earth is concave 
  
By contrast, act-related nouns with that- clauses can be in the plural: 
 
(8) seven claims that the earth is concave 
 
Arsenijevic takes this to be evidence for the standard ontological view of there being just 
events and propositions and not a third category of attitudinal objects. Claims that S thus 
denotes events rather than attitudinal objects, whereas belief that S stands for a proposition. I 
don’t think the data warrant this conclusion: the same diagnostics for attitudinal objects apply 
to act-related attitudinal plural nouns with clausal modifiers, for example the applicability of 
predicates of satisfaction as in (9) and the understanding of part of as partial content as in 
(10): 
 
(9) a. Mary’s promises to quit smoking were never fulfilled. 
     b. John’s requests for Mary to visit him could not be complied with.  
     c. Bill’s decisions to write a book were never carried out. 
(10) That his sister perished is part of John’s claim that his family perished. 
 
The maximalization effect with state-related attitudinal nouns is a puzzling phenomenon, 
though. John could have believed that the earth is concave at two different times in his life. 
Yet, John’s two beliefs that the earth is concave is impossible, as would be the case for John’s 
two intentions to write a book, as opposed to John’s two decisions to write a book. I will 
return to the problem in its greater generality in Section 3.
10
 
                                                            
10 Arsenijevic gives a further argument against attitudinal objects being semantic values John’s belief that S or 
Mary’s claim that S.  NPs such as  John’s belief that S and John’s claim that S do not stand for particular 
attitudinal objects because with different agents, there won’t be different beliefs or claims with the same content 
that could be compared (?? I compared Johns belief / claim that S to Mary’s belief / claim that S). This argument 
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1.4.2. Truth predication 
 
Davis argues that attributing truth conditions to attitudinal objects is problematic since 
attitudinal objects could not be true in worlds in which they do not exist, pointing at the 
incompatibility of (11a) and (11b): 
 
(11) a. Your claim would be true even if you had not claimed that. 
       b. Your claim would exist even if you did not claim it. 
 
There are two possible responses to the issue. First, one may consider the term your claim that 
S as standing not for a particular attitudinal object but for a kind of attitudinal object, which 
exists even in worlds in which the claim was not made. Second, is true need not be viewed as 
an ordinary property, and there are various (e.g. deflationist) philosophical views on which it 
isn’t.  Such a view is also available within truthmaker semantics, where the truthmaking 
conditions for truth attributions may be given as in (12a), whereas the trutmaking conditions 
for existential sentences could (simplified) be as in (12b):  
 
(12) a. For a truthbearer o, o is true iff s  s╟ o 
       b. a exists is true iff a ╟ a exists. 
 
That is, a truthmaker for the existence statement a exists is a itself. This means that a exist is 
true only in situations that include a itself. By contrast, a truthmaker for a truthbearer o need 
not contain o itself and in fact may be part of a world in which o does not exist. 
       There are also interesting issues concerning the intuitions about sentences of the sort in 
(11a). For me, such sentences are considerably worse with correct, rather bad with predicates 
of fulfillment, and impossible with agent-related predicates of satisfaction: 
 
(13) a. ?? Your claim that S would be correct even if you had not claimed that S. 
        b. ?? John’s request to be able to leave would have been fulfilled even if he did not  
            request that. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
is problematic, however, since attitudinal objects enter similarity relations based on content only and thus could 
not compared in other respects in the first place. 
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       c. ??? I would follow your advice to publish the book even if you had not advised me to  
            publish it. 
        d. ??? Joe would carry out his decision to publish the book even if he did not decide to  
           publish the book. 
   
This means that, unlike truth predicates, predicates of correctness and fulfillment express 
properties that require the existence of the truthbearer (berarer of correctness or satisfaction) 
in a truthmaking situation. The reason for that in the case of correct, is the association of an 
intrinsic norm with an attitudinal object that has a world–word/mind direction of fit. In the 
case of predicates of satisfaction this appears to be due to satisfaction requiring recognition of 
the request or advice being made: it is satisfaction by way of recognizing the request or advice 
(Searle 1983). 
 
1.4.3. Similarity and part structure 
 
Davis raises another concern about attitudinal objects. Attitudinal objects enter similarity 
relations strictly based on being the same in content. How is this possible if attitudinal objects 
are also concrete and may come with a physical realization? Even though this seems a puzzle 
given standard conceptions of objects, there is a category of entities that behaves exactly the 
same way, namely tropes, that is, particularized properties or Aristotelian accidents)  (e.g. the 
shape of the object or John’s kindness). It is a fundamental feature of tropes to be similar (‘the 
same’) just in case they instantiate the same property (‘the shape of this object is the same as 
the shape of that object’). Other features of the bearers of tropes won’t matter for the 
similarity of tropes (e.g. spatio-temporal properties). In order to accommodate tropes and 
attitudinal objects standard conceptions of objects may just need to be revised (Moltmann 
2019). 
     The restriction of attitudinal objects to one of their ‘facets” when entering similarity 
relations can be related to their part structure being based strictly on partial content, again 
something Davis takes issue with.
11
 Attitudinal objects might be attributed temporal parts 
since they persist through time, and they enter a sort of part relation to lower-level and higher-
level attitudinal objects, e.g. locutionary products and perlocutionary objects in the case of 
                                                            
11 Again see Moltmann (2019) for a discussion of  related  issues. 
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illocutionary products. However, these do not count as the ordinary parts of attitudinal 
objects.  
      Davis addresses one of the motivations for attitudinal objects (as opposed to propositions), 
the unacceptability of identity statements such as (14): 
 
(14) ??? John’s belief is Mary’s claim. 
 
Davis agrees with such judgments and proposes that NPs such as John’s belief and Mary’s 
claim do not stand for pure propositions, but rather qua propositions, e.g. a propositions qua 
being believed by John or a proposition qua being claimed by Mary (which are taken to be 
propositions under a perspective rather than entities (qua-objects) distinct from propositions). 
Qua propositions inherit properties, such as truth, from their base propositions. A problem for 
Davis’ proposal is that it cannot be carried over to NPs such as John’s demand or Bill’s offer, 
which stand for entities that do not have truth conditions, but rather fulfillment or realization 
conditions. They could not possibly conceived as propositions under a perspective 
(propositions qua being demanded by John or propositions qua being offered by Bill). Such 
NPs display the same unacceptability in identity statements:  
 
(15) a. ??? John’s demand is Mary’s claim. 
       b. ??? John’s request (to take a vacation) is Bill’s offer (for John to take a vacation). 
       c. ??? John’s decision is Mary’s request. 
 
A demand is not a proposition qua being demanded, since the latter would inherit truth 
conditions from the proposition, but a demand has satisfaction conditions. A decision is not a 
proposition qua being decided, since it won’t have truth conditions, but rather realization 
conditions. Taking intuitions about nominalizations of attitude verbs seriously makes 
attitudinal objects rather unavoidable. 
 
2. The syntactic basis and the compositional semantics 
 
2.1. Davidsonian event semantics 
 
In the paper, I argued for a logical form of attitude reports and modal sentences, without 
elaborating a compositional semantics and the syntactic structure that is taken to be input to 
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interpretation and without making explicit any constraints on the syntax-semantics interface. 
What is important about the proposed semantics is that clausal complements (or units) act as 
predicates of attitudinal objects and that special quantifiers range over attitudinal objects or 
kinds of them. I adopted Davidsonian event semantics mainly in order to stay with a standard 
approach to the semantics adverbials and because it provides an easy of way of introducing 
attitudinal objects into the semantic structure of attitude reports. I agree with Liefke that an 
explicit compositional analysis is as yet missing. I also agree with Matthews that the syntactic 
basis for the semantic analysis needs to be elaborated (and I agree with him that the actual 
syntactic structure of attitude reports (and embedded clauses in general) may not be what it 
seems and that the standard relational semantics of attitude reports was mistaken about the 
actual syntactic structure of attitude reports).  
      Matthews criticizes my use of Davidsonian event semantics. The reason is that 
Davidsonian events do not meet a constraint on the syntax-semantics interface, namely that 
entities that appear in the semantic structure of sentences need to be denotations of NPs. This 
is a constraint that is certainly interesting to discuss (and it has been endorsed by various 
philosophers that follow the Fregeanean and Quinean criteria of ontological commitment). It 
is not a constraint, though, that has generally been adopted in natural language semantics, 
where it is common to posit implicit arguments, entities that fail to be denotations of NPs, yet 
act as arguments of predicates or play some other semantic role. Besides Davidsonian events, 
degrees, standards of taste, situations (for quantifier restrictions), and modes of presentations 
(for the semantics of attitude reports) are examples. The constraint Matthews suggests is one 
that a good part of formal semantics does not aim to meet. At the same time, is not obvious 
that Davidsonian event semantics would not be able to meet the constraint, given theories of 
radical lexical decomposition on which verbs like walk are taken to be derived from complex 
predicates of the sort take walk (Hale/Kayser 2002). 
 
2.2. Harves/Kayne-style analysis of need generalized to attitude reports 
 
We can now turn to the question of the syntactic structure of attitude reports and modal 
sentences that would be input to semantic interpretation. There is one type of syntactic 
proposal that is appears particularly suited for the semantics outlined in the paper, namely one 
on which modal verbs are underlyingly complex predicates consisting of a light verb and a 
noun denoting modal or attitudinal objects, such as have need for need and have belief and 
make claim for believe and claim. Both Arsenijevic and Matthews bring  up that proposal in 
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their commentaries, and I will take the occasion to elaborate it further in view of the 
semantics proposed in the paper. 
      Harves/Kayne (2012) proposed a syntactic analysis of sentences with the modal verb need  
according to which (16a) has the underlying structure in (16b): 
 
(16) a. John needs to walk. 
       b. John has [need to walk]. 
 
In (16b), need is the head of an object NP modified by what is taken to be a relative clause (to 
walk) and is obtained by raising need and incorporating it into the verb. (16b) involves 
explicit reference to a modal object and as the underlying structure of (16a) suits the proposed 
semantics based on modal objects perfectly. The literal interpretation of (16b) in (16c) is then 
also the interpretation of (16a): 
 
(16) c. d(have(John d) & need(d) & [John to walk](d)) 
.  
On that analysis, the complement clause, being treated as a relative clause modifying a noun, 
is not a referential term referring to a proposition. 
     Arsenijevic (2007) has proposed an analysis along the same lines for attitude reports. In his 
commentary, he modifies the analysis somewhat to suit the present semantics based on 
attitudinal and modal objects. On that analysis, the underlying structure of (17a) is the one in 
(17b), where claim occupies the specifier position of a force projection (for evidential, 
attitudinal or modal material), which I will here call simply ‘FP’. On that analysis, (17a) has 
the structure in (17b).  
 
(17) a. John claims that S 
       b. John make [DP[NPclaim] [that [FP [SPEC claim [F’[F C] [CPS]]]]] 
       c. John claimi-make [DP[ei] that [FP ei  S]]]] 
 
The specifier position of FP can also be occupied by adverbials that introduce an intensional 
context (reportedly, according to Joe). The head of the force projection FP is occupied by a 
silent element ‘C’. The embedded sentence S is taken to be a complement to F.  
     Arsenijevic proposes a semantic interpretation of the structure in (17b), which I will clarify 
and modify somewhat as follows (also in view of special quantifiers like something, which I 
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will come to shortly). First of all, I take the noun claim to be interpreted in the lower position. 
The sentence S will denote a pair consisting of a set of truthmakers A and a set of falsity 
makers B. The silent element C will denote a function from sentence denotations (pairs 
consisting of a set of truthmakers and falsity makers) to properties of attitudinal or modal 
object, as in (18a): 
 
(18) a. [C] =  λABλd[A is a partial content of pos(d) &  neg(d) ≠ Ø  neg(d)  B] 
 
That is, C denotes the function mapping the set (of truhmakers) A and the set (of the falsity 
makers) B onto attitudinal or modal objects d such that A is a partial content of the set of 
satisfiers of d and B is a subset of the set of violators of d, if d has violators. This is based on 
the partial content condition (29) in the paper (which will later, in Section 3.4. be replaced by 
a complete content condition). The that-clause then denotes the property in (18b) and the 
entire sentence (17a) will have the logical form in (18b) (now not making use of Davisonian 
event semantics): 
 
(18) b. λd [claim(d) & the content of d is a partial content of S] 
        c. d(make(John, d) & [that claim C S](d)) 
 
     The very same semantics will take care of evidential or attitudinal adverbials occurring in 
the specifier position of the force projection of a clause, such as reportedly or according to the 
newspaper. Such adverbials will act as predicates of the attitudinal object, just like the noun 
claim in (17a), specifying its epistemic source. 
     This syntactic analysis of modal and attitudinal sentences still faces several challenges, 
such as the question of how to account for the difference between optional and obligatory 
clausal complements and how to extend it to modal auxiliaries and attitude verbs whose 
nominalizations are derived from the verb rather than conversely, how to account for why 
some attitude verbs take special quantifiers such as something in place of a complement and 
others don’t (e.g. remark, complain). Finally, the Harves/Kayne-style analysis rests on the 
assumption that clausal complements are in fact relative clauses modifying nouns, when the 
construction N that S is itself subject to controversy (Cuba 2017, Krapova/Cinque 2016, 
Mikkelsen/Hankamer 2020).  What is most important, however, is clarify the syntactic 
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structure of constructions with intensional predicates, which may be quite different from what 
it first appeared and that semanticists and philosophers took for granted.
12
 
 
2.3. Special quantifiers 
 
Special quantifiers and pronouns such as something, what and that, on the view outlined in the 
paper, range over attitudinal objects or kinds of them. The paper did not elaborate how they 
are able to stand for those entities, pointed out by Matthews. There are different options for 
their compositional analysis and underlying syntactic structures.  
     In earlier work (Moltmann 2003a, b, 2013a), I gave a compositional semantic analysis of 
special quantifiers. The one syntactic assumption that was made and that was not further 
elaborated, that was that the morpheme –thing (which may appear overtly as in something  
stay silent) undergoes movement, incorporating into the verb. While the verb claim denotes a 
relation between events and agents, the predicate claim-thing (with incorporated –thing) 
denotes a relation between events, agents and attitudinal objects or kinds of them, as in (19b). 
This allows (19a) to be interpreted as in (19c), that is, as ‘there is an event e and an attitudinal 
object d, such that the relation ‘claim-thing’ (as in (19b)) holds between e, John, and d’: 
 
(19) a. John claimed something. 
       b. For any e, x, and d, claim-thing(e, x, d) iff claim(e, x) and d = att-obj(e). 
       c. ed claim-thing(e, John, d) 
 
    In view of Arsenijevic’s analysis of clausal complements of attitude verbs discussed in the 
last section, there is now an alternative syntactic analysis of special quantifiers with attitude 
verbs available: claim (as a noun standing for attitudinal objects or kinds of them) originates 
in the specifier position of the force projection FP  headed by the noun thing. It then 
undergoes movement, left-adjoining and incorporating into the verb, with the underlying 
                                                            
12 Liefke is concerned with how the semantics of attitude reports in the paper can be cast within a standard, type-
theoretic compositional semantics and proposes some modifications of the semantics to facilitate 
compositionality. This endeavor appears to be premature given that the actual syntax of attitude reports may be 
considerably different from what it appears. I disagree with some of the specific modification Liefke adopts, 
such as separating attitudinal objects from their contents and taking events to be content bearers.  
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structure being interpreted as in (20c), where the compound claim thing is just taken to denote 
things that are claims:
13
 
 
(20) a. John make [DPsome [[SPECclaim] [Fthing]]FP] 
       b. John claim-make [some [SPECe] thing]]FP] 
       c. d(make(John, d) & [claim-thing](d)) 
 
    Davis argues against the view that special quantifiers as complements of attitude verbs 
range over attitudinal objects or kinds of them; he endorses the standard view instead on 
which they range over propositions. One of the motivations for the present view were 
quantifier restrictions that cannot be understood as predicates of propositions (said something 
nice, claimed something that caused astonishment, promised something impossible to fulfil). 
Davis proposes that nice in John said something nice is short for ‘nice to say’. This is 
problematic linguistically: to-infinitival complements of adjectives generally cannot stay 
silent (John said something easy *(to say), John believes something hard *(to believe)). 
Moreover, the suggestion cannot account for predicates of satisfaction (Mary requested 
something hard to comply with, Mary promised something impossible to fulfill). Predicates of 
satisfaction do not allow for infinitival complements, and they do not apply to propositions. 
Davis’s critique also fails because he ignores the second motivation for special quantifiers 
ranging over attitudinal objects or kinds of them, namely restrictions on reports of sharing of 
the content of different attitudes, namely: reports of sharing are acceptable only if the attitudes 
are of the same, unless there is a perceivable effect of re-analysis taking place (??? John 
assumes what Bill heard, that the situation will get better, ??? Bill believes what Mary 
requested that Joe should be declared the winner). Such constraints on sharing were 
elaborated at greater length in previous work (Moltmann 2003a, b, 2013a) and are a 
considerable problem for the standard proposition-based semantics of attitude reports.  
      Davis mentions cases where special quantifiers seem to not stand for attitudinal objects 
but rather only their content, such as ??? John did not acquire what he believes yesterday vs 
John did not acquire his belief yesterday). I do agree that special quantifiers may have more 
of a pure-content reading than attitudinal nouns, which might be attributed to a flexibility of 
special quantifiers being able to range not just over i-objects, but also entities construed from 
                                                            
13 Arsenijevic assumes that functional categories are not able to stand for things. I don’t agree: light nouns in the 
sense of Richard Kayne (thing, place, time, number) are functional categories, and they denote things. 
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their satisfaction conditions. This is the case with intensional transitive verbs, where special 
quantifiers range over variable satisfiers (Section 5 and Moltmann 2013a, chap. 5).
14
 
 
2.4. Subject clauses 
 
Moulton makes a very interesting observation about that-clauses in subject position. In the 
paper, I suggested that, for example, in That S is true, that S serves to characterize a 
contextually given attitudinal object. Moulton points out that certain predicates of attitudinal 
objects are inapplicable to clauses in subject position, mentioning loud (The claim that bike 
lanes hurt business / ??? That bike lanes hurt business was loud). One can add that predicates 
such as caused surprise and nice are applicable to clauses in subject position, but then could 
not apply to a contextually given claim; instead they trigger a factive reading applying to a 
fact.  These observations mean that attitudinal objects are not available for subject clauses in 
the same way as for clausal complements of attitude verbs.  
       An explanation of that is available on Arsenijevic’ analysis of complement clauses. The 
complement clause of attitude verbs, on that analysis, involves an attitudinal noun in the 
specifier position of the force projection which then moves into a nominal position in the 
main clause (with subsequent corporation into the verb). By contrast, it is plausible that 
clausal subjects instead involve only a functional element in the same position, such as a 
silent light nouns like FACT or, for predicates like true, a noun one might call ‘SOA’, for 
states of affairs. In the paper, ‘the fact that S’ is conceived as the modal object whose 
truthmakers are the truthmakers of S that are part of the actual world. Similarly, ‘the state of 
affairs that S’ can be conceived as a modal object, the modal objects whose satisfiers are just 
                                                            
14 This account for inferences such as the one from (i) to (iii) via (ii) below: 
 
(i) a. John needs a white shirt.  
    b. Bill needs a blue shirt. 
(ii) a. John needs a shirt. 
   b. Bill needs a shirt. 
(iii) John and Bill need the same thing. 
 
Liefke proposes to apply the attitudinal objects view to transitive uses of imagine, in particular the invalid 
inference from Uli imagines a lion and Ede imagines a penguin to There is an animal that Uli and Ede are both 
imagining. She takes some animal to range over attitudinal objects and the inference is invalid because there is 
no single attitudinal object that the two acts of imagination share. For me the inference is ruled out because the 
conclusion involves restricted existential quantification outeide the scope of the intensional (or rather intentional) 
verb imagine. I disagree with Liefke’s  sententialist analysis of imagine and the use of attitudinal objects for the 
semantics of imagine. For me imagine involves intentional objects that depend on the act of imagination, which 
are neither attitudinal objects nor variable satisfiers (Moltmann 2015). 
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the truthmakers of S.
15
 Positing functional elements only in the left periphery of subject 
clauses explains why some predicates (e.g. evaluative predicates) trigger a factive reading of a 
subject clause even if those predicates could be true of attitudinal objects (That S is nice / 
strange vs the remark that S is nice / strange). Why that-clauses can only stand for facts with 
some predicates and not states of affairs remains to be explained. 
 
3.  The content of clausal complements as predicates 
 
One important motivation for truthmaker semantics was to provide a notion of partial content, 
a notion that standard possible-worlds semantics is not able to provide (Yablo 2014, Fine 
2017a, b, c). I-objects display a part structure strictly based on partial content, which is thus 
imortant for the ontology of i-objects. The notion of partial content was also used for the 
meaning of that-clauses or sentential units as predicates of attitudinal or modal objects. This 
partial-content condition says informally: for a sentence S and attitudinal or modal object d, 
[S](d) iff the content of S is a partial content of d, which means that every satisfier of d is 
contained in a truthmaker of S and every truthmaker f S has a satisfier of d as part (and the 
falsitymakers of S are among the violators of d if d has violators). There are two sorts of 
critiques of the partial-content condition in the commentaries, one by Matthews, another by 
Elliott. 
 
3.1. Specifying vs describing a belief 
 
Matthews argues that complement clauses do not specify the content of an attitudinal object, 
in particular a belief, but only describe it, making use of a distinction between specifying and 
describing content by Bach (1997). Matthews does not elaborate the distinction between 
specifying and describing. I will therefore discuss the original proposal by Bach for belief- 
reports. For Bach for a that-clause to describe a belief means, it seems, three things: [1] the 
belief can be more specific than the content of the that-clause, [2] a referential term in the 
that-clause may be used not just to refer to an entity, but may also indicate ‘mode 
presentation’ of the entity (a term that Bach himself rejects, but it is here used just to describe 
the phenomenon of opacity);  [3] a term in the that-clause that the agent may not be familiar 
                                                            
15 States of affairs may also be the denotation of that S in the object position (and subject position) with non-
attitudinal predicates such as imply (that S implies that S’).  
22 
 
with or agree with can be used to refer to an entity as part of the agent’s belief. I will discuss 1 
and 3 first and turn to 2 in a separate section, since this is an issue also addressed by Davis. 
       The proposal of the paper is that clausal complements of attitude verbs give the partial 
truthmaker-based content of the relevant attitudinal object. Given that account, [3] is in fact 
unproblematic: truthmaking situations, as worldly entities, do not care about the particular 
expression used or the conceptual content of an expression.      
     What would be cases of [1]? Bach mentions (21a) on a specific reading of someone; 
Matthews mentions (21b), again with Sally having a particular person in mind: 
 
(21) a. Newt thinks that someone is following him, but I forgot who. 
        b. Sally believes that someone stole the silver spoon. 
 
If someone is used specifically, again this is not a problem for the present view: someone on 
that reading is meant to stand for the particular person the described agent has in mind and 
thus the truthmakers of the that-clause are just the truthmakers of the belief. This is different 
if someone was to be understood non-specifically (i.e. quantificationally). The that-clause in 
(21a) then expresses a general proposition that is made true by any situation of a person 
stealing the silver spoon, and these would also be the situations that make Sally’s belief that 
someone stole the silver spoon true. This is of course an undesirable result. Even though this 
is not how the examples may have been intended, the non-specific reading is not excluded by 
Bach’s account of ‘describing’. Bach imposes only one condition on the relation between the 
that-clause and the belief it describes and imposes the condition that the belief should require 
the truth of the that-clause. Given classical entailment, this is clearly too weak a condition: 
irrelevant consequences do not provide a way of describing the content of an attitude. 
Moreover, the specific belief classically entails the general proposition, and thus a that-clause  
with the unspecific reading of someone should be suited to describe a belief about a particular 
a particular object in the case in question. The inadequacy of that is even more obvious with 
attitudinal objects like claims: Mary’s claim that the maid stole the silver spoon cannot be 
described as ‘Mary’s claim that someone stole the silver spoon’, with an unspecific reading of 
someone. The latter would be true if the butler stole the silver spoon, but not so for the former.  
     Truthmaker semantics avoids the problem. The general proposition is not a partial content 
of the specific proposition since a possible situation of the butler stealing the silver (a 
truthmaker of the general proposition) is not part of any situation of the maid stealing the 
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silver (a truthmaker of the specific belief). Truthmaker semantics only permits the belief to 
have a more complex content, not a less specific content.  
    To summarize, [1] and [3] thus are not problems for the present account, in fact the present 
truthmaker-based account avoids an undesirable consequence of Bach’s notion of 
‘describing’, namely the applicability of a general propositional content for the description of 
a specific belief. 
 
3.2. Opacity 
 
Bach’s notion of ‘describing’ beliefs is meant to deal with the general problem of opacity, for 
example (22a) below, cited also by Matthews, which does not entail (22b): 
 
(22) a. Poker believes that Bruce Wayne is a wimp. 
        b. Poker’s belief that Batman is a wimp. 
 
As Bach emphasizes, opacity may arise with the choice of one term over a different, 
coreferential one, but it may also arises with a particular uses of the same coreferential name 
and with different coreferential uses of a pronoun, as has been discussed in the literature 
(Kripke’s Paderewski case, Crimmins/Perry’s 1989 phone booth case). In all those cases, 
what is commonly considered a ‘mode of presentation’ associated with a name or use of a 
name or pronoun is part of the content of a described attitude and bears on the overall truth 
conditions of the  attitude report. Matthews as well as Davis take opacity to be a problem for 
the present truthmaker-based semantics. 
       The truthmaker-based semantics as it has been laid out in the paper in fact has so far 
nothing to say about opacity. It does, though, predict the non-identity of beliefs that have the 
same truthmaking conditions, but, intuitively, involve different modes of presentation. That is, 
(23) is predicted to be false:
16
  
 
(23) Pierre’s belief that London is pretty is Pierre’s belief that Londres is pretty. 
 
                                                            
16 Davis says the opposite, erroneously so. 
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Beliefs as attitudinal objects do not just have a truthmaker-based content; they may be more 
specific than that and involve various components or features that, as cognitive particulars, 
would amount to modes of presentation. 
    Opacity actually is not more of a problem for the present semantics than it is for Bach’s 
own proposal, given how Bach tells us the semantics of belief reports is to be understood, 
namely: a believes that S is true iff for a certain belief state d of a, S describes d. Just replace 
‘belief state’ by ‘belief’, an attitudinal object. This account does not solve the problem of 
opacity. The problem with Bach’s formulation is ‘a certain’. This cannot mean (and clearly is 
not meant to be) existential quantification, since that would not tell us how the choice of one 
name as opposed to another could bear on the truth conditions of the attitude report. Rather 
what seems to be meant is that a particular type belief (state) is part of the speaker’s intentions 
and thus bears on the truthconditions of the attitude report. But that won’t suffice.  Particular 
features or components of that belief (state) will have to be associated with things the 
belief(state) is about and as part of the speakers’ intention bear on the overall truth conditions 
on the belief report.  
     Let us set aside the question of how Bach’s (and thus Matthews’) proposal should actually 
be understood and address the question of how ‘modes of presentation’ could figure in the 
intended meaning of an attitude report involving attitudinal objects and their satisfaction 
conditions. 
       One approach one might pursue is to connect an attitudinal object with a background 
attitudinal object, such as a background belief (or a background desire, in the case of a 
complex attitude of desire). Background attitudinal objects are certainly needed to deal with 
presuppositions. For the present purposes, it is important that different agents may have 
different background beliefs regarding a particular object, and a particular such background 
belief may be part of the intended meaning of the utterance. A background belief may also 
contain beliefs regarding the use of a particular name, its relation to a bearer and to other uses 
of the name. This approach has limits, though, in that it would not be able to account for 
potential differences in modes of presentation associated with different occurrences of a 
pronoun or name standing for the same individual. 
      Alternatively, or perhaps in addition to the first approach, one might pursue a 
Crimmins/Perry (1989)-style approach within truthmaker semantics, namely in the sense of 
taking modes of presentations to be components of belief states / beliefs and thus to be 
cognitive particulars. Modes of presentation in that sense then need to be connected to 
elements in the truthmaker-based belief content. By ‘truthmaker-based belief content’ I 
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simply mean what the belief is about, a notion that in truthmaker semantics can be construed 
simply as the fusion of the situations that are truthmakers of the belief (Fine 2017c). That is, 
for a belief d, the fusion of the set of truthmaking situations of d, fus(pos(d)), is what d is 
about. Modes of presentation will be associated with elements in such a belief content in the 
sense of those elements being individuals playing particular roles in in situations, not just 
individuals (in order to account for the various cases of opacity). 
      Very generally, then, for John believes that S, there will be a relation Cu(S), determined by 
the intentions of the speaker when uttering S (u(S)), which relates John’s belief d (that is, 
relevant components or features of d) to what d is about, the fus( pos(d)) (Cu(S)(d, 
fus(pos(S)))). That is, if Cu(S)(d, fus(pos(S))) obtains then the speaker of u(S) associates 
components or features of d with individuals that are part of fusion(pos(d)). The logical form 
of a belief report John believes that S will then be as in (24a), which takes into account the 
actual syntactic structure of the sentence as discussed Section 2.2. and is equivalent to (24b): 
 
(24) a. d(belief-have(John, d) & Cu(S)(d, fus(pos(d)) & [CPthat  [FPbelief [FC] S]]] (d))   
       b. d(have(John, d) & belief(d) & Cu(S)(d, fus(pos(d)) & [that S](d))  
 
That is, for an attitudinal object d had by John that is a belief and has the satisfaction 
conditions given by S, features or components of d relate to elements in what d is about in the 
way intended by the speaker when uttering the that-clause. 
     Where should the condition Cu(S) come from?  That is, what is its syntactic basis? A 
plausible view is that it is associated with the head of the force projection FP, just like the 
silent element C that mediates between sentential content (given by the IP that is complement 
of F) and the property of attitudinal or modal objects denoted by the that-clause as a whole.  
This would explain why not only attitude verbs set up an opaque sentential context, but also 
attitudinal adverbials (According to Pierre, London is pretty; Reportedly, John smokes) 
(Section 2.2.), as noted by Bach (1997). The use of the condition Cu(S) would thus be part of a 
compositional, syntax-based semantics This differentiates the proposal from that of 
Crimmins/Perry (1989), who take modes of presentation to make up an additional argument 
position of the belief relation and thus adopt a hidden-indexical theory.  
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     While this proposal awaits an elaboration of the details, it is clear that the proposed 
truthmaker-based semantics of attitude reports does allow for an account of opacity.
 17
 It is 
important to keep in mind that specifying satisfaction conditions is a central feature of the 
overall truthmaker-based semantics of attitudinal and modal predicates. Without clauses (or 
sentential units) having the function of specifying satisfaction conditions with both attitudinal 
and modal predicates, it would be impossible to account for the connections between attitude 
reports and modals which have been at the center of the paper.
18
  
 
3.4. Partial or equal content? 
 
According to the semantics of attitude reports and modal sentences given in the paper, clauses 
when acting as predicates of attitudinal or modal objects specify a partial content of the 
attitudinal or modal object. Elliott in his commentary argues against the partial-content 
condition and in favor of that-clauses giving an equal content of the content bearer of which 
they are predicated. I now think myself that the partial-content condition should be 
abandoned. However, Elliot’s observations may also allow for a syntactic explanation.  
     One of Elliott’s arguments comes from the observation that that-clauses cannot be stacked, 
unlike relative clauses: 
 
(25) * John believes that it is raining that it is cold. 
 
Elliott takes the reason to be semantic (see also Moulton 2009): that-clauses give the full 
content of the described attitude and thus there can be only a single that-clause. It is not 
obvious, though, that the reason for the impossibility of stacking is semantic. It may follow 
from Arsenijevic’ analysis on which clausal complements require raising of a attitudinal noun 
from the left periphery of the clause into a position within the main clause.  
                                                            
17 For the particular case of verbs of saying, the ontology of attitudinal objects provides yet another way of 
dealing with hyperintensionality, In Moltmann (2017b), I proposed that clausal complements of verbs of saying 
arguably characterize an attitudinal object that is the product of a locutionary act in Austin’s (1962) sense, that 
is, they characterize the sorts of expressions or concepts used, rather (just) specifying the satisfaction conditions 
of an illocutionary product. Whether an expression in a clause contributes that way depends entirely on context 
(speaker’s intentions). 
 
18 Moreover, as has been discussed in the philosophical literature, attitudinal objects may to an extent be 
individuated in terms of their satisfaction conditions, rather than their psychological composition (e.g. Stalnaker  
1987). 
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      Stacking of clausal complements of nouns would moreover be excluded by 
Mikkelsen/Hankamer (2020) account, on which the definite determiner syntactically selects 
the clausal complement.
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     Elliott’s second argument comes from NPs of the sort the fact that S and the possibility 
that S. He points out that such NPs require the definite singular determiner, which indicates 
that the that-clause in that construction gives the complete content of the fact or possibility. 
The requirement of the singular definite article in NPs with clausal modifiers is a very 
interesting phenomenon, but again it is not obvious that it is a semantic rather than a syntactic 
phenomenon. There are also various nouns with a clausal modifier that do not require the 
definite (singular) determiner, but permit the indefinite article or the plural. Elliott (Fn 12) 
mentions requirement (a requirement that we stay indoors). Nouns describing act-related 
attitudinal objects generally are of that sort, as in (27), as are nouns describing teleological or 
physical possibilities, as in (28) and (29): 
 
(26) a. Mary’s repeated claims that John is guilty 
       b. a rumor that Joe is sick 
(27) Mary’s various decisions to write a book  
(28) a. a possibility of opening the window 
       b. three possibilities of opening the window 
(29) a. an offer to buy the house 
       b. an ability to convince everyone 
 
By contrast, state-related attitudinal nouns generally need to be definite and singular, even if 
there could have been different (say, temporally separated) states or state-related attitudinal 
objects:
20
 
 
                                                            
19 Elliott himself (Fn 13) observes that CP-complements can be conjoined:  
 
(i) a. John claimed that he solved the problem and that he solved the problem this morning. 
 
Syntactically, (ia) should be possible on Arsenijevic’ analyses if it involves across-the-board extraction of the 
attitudinal noun. Semantically, (ia) should be allowed as well, since the verb describes two events associated 
with two different attitudinal objects. Note that conjoined CPs can modify plural nouns as in (ib), though not 
singular nouns as in (iic): 
 
(i) b John’s claims that he solved the problem and that he solved the problem this morning. 
     c. ?? John’s claim that he solved the problem and that he solved the problem this morning. 
20 Note that they do not require the definite article, though. 
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(30) a. Mary’s belief that she won the race 
       b. ??? Mary’s two beliefs that she won a race 
(31) a. Mary’s intention to write a book 
       b. ??? Mary’s intentions to write a book 
 
Arsenijevic, who, as mentioned, addresses the same phenomenon in his commentary, points 
out that state-related nouns when they take clausal complements display a ‘maximalization 
effect’, just like nouns for facts and epistemic possibilities. He takes the distinction at play to 
be that between event- and proposition-denoting nouns. However, this cannot be right: 
intentions, facts, and epistemic possibilities can hardly be regarded propositions, and offers, 
abilities and teleological possibilities are not events.  
     The reason for the maximalization effect may be a syntactic one: the N-CP construction 
with the relevant class of nouns may involve a different syntactic structure, namely the one 
proposed by Mikkelsen/Hankamer (2020). On that analysis, the definite determiner selects the 
CP, that is, the belief that S has the underlying structure [belief [DP the that-S]DP]NP with 
subsequent raising of the determiner the to yield [the [belief [e that S]]NP]DP. The definite 
determiner is hence obligatory. On the present approach, there is a different interpretation 
available for such a structure, of very roughly the following sort. the+that S is first interpreted 
as the most general modal object determined by S, states of affairs that S; subsequently, the 
noun in the higher position maps that modal object onto a belief, fact, or possibility, by 
filtering the satisfiers/violators of that modal object. 
     I think there are also clearly semantic arguments against the partial-content condition 
proposed in the paper. One of them is the reading of completely below: 
 
(32) John completely agrees that Joe is incapable to do the job. 
 
If the that-clause specified just part of the content of the object of agreement, then completely 
could have a reading relating to a richer, in part contextually given, content; but it just cannot 
have such a reading. The same holds for completely with factive verbs: 
 
(33)  John completely understood that the problem is unsolvable. 
 
With that-clauses specifying a partial content it would also be hard to make sense of namely 
as below, which appears to explicate an entity in its entirety: 
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(34) a. ?? John invited some women, namely Mary. 
        b. ?? John expects something, namely that Mary will be invited (in fact he expects that  
           Mary and Joe will be invited). 
 
      The partial-content condition given in the paper was motivated by cases of 
underspecification of a desire by the complement clause, as discussed in the literature by Fara 
Graff (2013) and others, the kind of underspecification which holds in the very same way for 
modals like need. In fact, there seems to be an intuitive difference between attitudinal and 
modal objects with different directions of fit in the sense of Searle (1969, 1983) (as noted in 
Fn 21 in the paper). While attitudinal and modal objects with a world–word/mind direction of 
fit clearly display the sort of underspecification of their satisfaction conditions by the clausal 
complement, the same does not hold for beliefs, claims and other attitudinal objects with a 
word/mind-world direction of fit. Fiona’s belief that she caught a fish and Fiona’s claim that 
she caught a fish appear true just in case Fiona caught a fish, whether edible or not. This also 
seems to hold for epistemic modals, as opposed to deontic modals (e.g. the likelihood or 
probability for Fiona to have caught a fish). (Of course it also holds for facts: the fact that 
Fiona caught a fish obtains regardless of whether she caught a fish she can eat or not).  
     Setting aside attitudinal and modal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit, there 
are good grounds to reject the partial-content condition, in favor of an equal-content 
condition. The equal-content condition cannot be as proposed in Elliott’s (10), though. 
Whereas the truthmaker-based content of a sentence consists in a set of satisfiers and a set of 
violators, an attitudinal object that has the force of possibility will lack violators. The equal-
content condition should therefore be  as below, where pos(d) is the set of satisfiers and 
neg(d) the set of violators of an attitudinal object d: 
 
(35)  Truthmaker-based meaning of a sentence specifying complete satisfaction conditions     
         λd[pos(d) = pos(S)  & (neg(d) ≠ Ø   neg(d) = neg(S))] 
 
     The remaining challenge is to account for the possibility of underspecification with 
attitudinal and modal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit. It is implausible that 
clausal complements should express different properties of content-bearers depending on the 
directions of fit of the attitudinal or modal object that the embedding predicate describes. In 
fact, some of the diagnostics for an equal-content condition apply to predicates involving a 
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world-word/mind direction of fit as well, such as the impossibility of stacking and the 
understanding of namely-phrases: 
 
(36) a. * Fiona wants [to catch a fish] [to buy some wine]. 
       b. Fiona wants something, namely to catch a fish. 
 
Clearly, for attitudinal and modal objects with a world-word/mind direction of fit, the 
completion of the satisfaction conditions conveyed by the clause must come from the context. 
But it can’t be a background belief or common ground that would provide the completion. 
Rather what completes an incomplete specification of attitudinal or modal objects with a 
world-word/mind direction of fit is conditions constitutive of an ideal situation in which what 
is desired or needed is fulfilled. Only with those conditions as background can the clausal 
complement give the full satisfaction conditions of the desire. This suggestion, of course, 
needs to be spelled out in detail.
21
 
 
4. The connection between propositional attitudes and modality 
 
4.1. Mood 
 
The paper gave a novel account of modal concord, according to which harmonic modals as in 
the most plausible reading of the sentence below are treated of predicates of the modal object 
that is – in a sense – part of the described attitudinal object of the main clause: 
 
(37) a. John demanded that Bill should leave. 
        b. John thinks the package might be for him. 
 
Portner and Rubinstein point out that such modals are part of a more general phenomenon, 
which also includes verbal mood. They point out that (37b) without can has a stronger reading 
than when can is present.  Can thus cannot be redundant, as it appears to be on the proposed 
account of harmonic modals. The present account, though, does not necessarily predict that. 
When can as a harmonic modal is predicated of the modal object that is part of the relevant 
propositional attitude, it may do more than specify that the modal object has no violators (that 
                                                            
21 See also Braun  (2015) for discussion. 
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is, is a modal object of possibility), for example it may imposing further conditions on its 
satisfiers.  
     As regards the semantics of mood in general, the present approach offers two types of 
options for dealing with it. One of them is that mood imposes a condition on the modal part of 
the described attitude, by specifying that it or does not have violators or that it has 
satisfiers/violators of particular sorts. The other option is it imposes conditions on the 
attitudinal object as such. For example, in the case of German subjunctive (which is triggered 
by verbs of saying),  it may impose the condition that the attitudinal object have a locutionary 
part. 
 
4.2. Inferential relations 
 
Another important connection between attitude verbs and modals are inferential relations such 
as that in (38), which Kaufmann addresses in her commentary: 
 
(38) a. Leave the room 
       b. You must leave the room! 
 
Kaufman emphasizes that the validity of from (38a) to (38b) is recognized in the literature 
under the descriptive reading of the modal, whereas the papers takes the modal to be used 
performatively. I agree that the inference is in fact better considered under a descriptive 
reading of the modal, and it would be straightforward to account for the validity of the 
inference on the present approach. On that approach, modal objects may be produced by acts. 
In particular, illocutionary acts may produce not just illocutionary products, but also modal 
objects (parts of the illocutionary product). This is what validates inferences such as (38).  
Kaufmann correctly notes that various types of inferences are then valid only under a dynamic 
notion of entailment and that that requires further formal development. 
     It is also important to keep in mind that there are various mereological operations 
applicable to modal objects, such as fusion and extraction (Moltmann 2018a), as well as 
possibly operations of revision, to deal with operations of updating (as recently discussed by 
Rothschild/Yablo, to appear). These will also be important when making the present approach 
more competitive with the formally more developed existing approaches to modals. 
 
4.3. Modals and syntactic structure 
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Ramchand in her commentary describes a fruitful application of truthmaker semantics within 
her work on modals. Making use of recent cartographic theories of the syntax of modals, her 
idea is that different types of modals associate with truthmakers of different sorts because 
different types of modals occupy different positions in the syntactic structure of a sentence. 
Clearly, that view can be combined with object-based truthmaker semantics, namely by 
associating different types of modal objects with the different syntactic positions in the 
sentence. 
 
4.4. Adverbial and verbal modals and free choice any 
 
Moulton points out interesting observations about the licensing of free choice any. Free 
choice any is licensed by modal verbs (of possibility), but not modal adverbials: 
 
(39) a. John might have taken any cards in this deck. 
       b. ??? Perhaps John took any cards in this deck. 
 
Given the present approach, modal verbs describe modal objects, epistemic modal adverbials, 
by contrast characterize the illocutionary product to be produced by the utterance of the 
sentence. That difference may be the source of the difference in (39), but how exactly remains 
to be elaborated. 
 
Acknowledgments 
I would like to thank Guglielmo Cinque and Gary Ostertag for comments on a previous 
version of this paper. 
 
References 
 
Arsijenević, Boban (2009): ‘Clausal complementation as relativization’, Lingua 119: 39-50.  
Austin, John L. (1962): How to do Things with Words?. Harvard UP, Cambridge, MA. 
Bach, Kent (1997): ‘Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs?’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78:  
     215– 241.  
Braun, David (2015): ‘Desiring, Desires, and Desire Ascriptions’. Philosophical Studies 172. 
33 
 
Crimins, Mark / John Perry (1989): ‘The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling         
     Beliefs’. Journal of Philosophy 86 (12), 685-711 
Davidson, Donald (1967): ‘The Logical Form of Action Sentences’. In N. Rescher (ed.): The  
     Logic of Decision and Action, Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 81–95.  
Graff Fara, Delia (2013): ‘Specifying Desire’. Noûs 47(2), 250--272. 
Fine, Kit (2017a): ‘Truthmaker Semantics’. In B. Hale et al. (eds.): A Companion to the  
     Philosophy of Language V, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 556–577. 
---------- (2017b): ‘A Theory of Truthmaker Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction, and  
      Negation’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 46, 625-674. 
----------- (2017c):’A Theory of Truthmaker Content II: Subject Matter, Common Content,  
     Remainder, and Ground’. Journal of Philosophical Logic 46, 675-702. 
---------- (2018a): ‘Compliance and command I’. Review of Symbolic Logic 11(4), 609–633.  
---------- (2018b): ‘Compliance and command II”. Review of Symbolic Logic 11(4), 634–664. 
Hale, Ken / Samuel J. Kayser (2002): Prolegomenon to a Theory of Argument Structure. MIT  
     Press, Cambridge (UMass.). 
Hankamer, Jorge / Line Mikkelsen (2020): ‘CP complements to D’. Linguistic Inquiry online  
     first. 
Harves, Stephanie / Richard Kayne (2012) Having ‘Need’ and Needing ‘Have’, Linguistic  
     Inquiry 43(1), 120-32. 
Krapova, Ileana / Guglielmo Cinque (2016): ‘On Noun-Clausal Complements and their Non- 
     unitary Nature’. Annali di CaFoscari vol. 50. 
Maienborn, Claudia, 2007, “On Davidsonian and Kimian States”, in I. Comorovski and K.  
     von Heusinger (eds.), Existence: Semantics and Syntax. Springer, pp. 107-130. 
Moltmann, Friederike (2003a):  'Nominalizing Quantifiers'. Journal of Philosophical  
     Logic 32(5), 445-481 
---------------------- (2003b):  'Propositional Attitudes without Propositions'. Synthese 135, 70-118 
--------------------- (2004): 'Nonreferential Complements, Derived Objects, and  
     Nominalizations'. Journal of Semantics 13, 2004,  1-43. 
-------------------- (2013a): Abstract Objects and the Semantics of Natural Language. Oxford  
     UP, Oxford. 
------------------- (2013b):  'On the Distinction Between Abstract States, Concrete States, and  
     Tropes'. In A. Mari / C. Beyssade / F. Del Prete (eds): Genericity. Oxford UP, Oxford,  
     292-311. 
----------------- (2015): 'Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs'. In A.  
34 
 
     Torza (ed.): Quantifiers, Quantifiers, Quantifiers. Springer, Dordrecht, 141-168. 
---------------- (2017a): ‘Cognitive Products and the Semantics and Attitude Verbs and  
     Deontic Modals’. In F. Moltmann / M. Textor (eds.): Act-Based Conceptions of  
     Propositional Content, Oxford UP, New York. 
----------------- (2017b): 'Levels of Linguistic Acts and the Semantics of Saying and Quoting'. In S.  
     L. Tsohatzidis (ed.): Interpreting Austin: Critical Essays. Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 34-59. 
----------------- (2018a): 'An Object-Based Truthmaker Theory for Modals'. Philosophical  
     Issues 28.1., 255-288.  
----------------- (2018b): 'Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and their Variants'. Synthese. online  
     first. 
----------------- (2019):'Ontological Dependence, Spatial Location, and Part Structure'. In C.  
     Masolo et al. (eds.): Ontology Makes Sense. Essays in Honor of Nicola Guarino. IOS  
    Publications, Amsterdam, 2019, 211-220. 
----------------- (2020): ‘Natural Language Ontology’, in R. Bliss and J. Miller (eds.):  
    Routledge Handbook of Metametaphyics, New York: Routledge. 
--------------- (to appear):  'Clauses as Semantic Predicates. Difficulties for Possible-Worlds  
     Semantics'. In R. Bhatt / I.Frana / P. Menendez-Benito (eds.): Making Worlds Accessible.  
     Festschrift for Angelika Kratzer, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, online. 
Rothschild, Daniel / Stephen Yablo (to appear): ‘Permissive Updates’. F. Faroldi / F. Van De  
    Putte (eds.): KITBOOK, Springer, Dordrecht.  
Searle, John (1969): Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
---------------- (1983): Intentionality. Cambridge: Cambridge UP. 
Stalnaker, Robert (1987): Inquiry. MIT Press, Cambridge (Mass.). 
Twardowski, Kazmierz (1912): ‘Actions and Products. Some Remarks on the Borderline of  
     Psychology, Grammar, and Logic’.  In J. Brandl and J. Wolenski (eds.), Kazimierz  
     Twardowski. On Actions, Products, and Other Topics in the Philosophy. Amsterdam and  
     Atlanta: Rodopi, 1999, pp. 103-132. 
Ulrich, William (1976): ‘An Alleged Ambiguity in the Nominalizations of Illocutionary  
      Verbs’.  Philosophica 18.2., 113-127. 
Yablo, Stephen (2014): Aboutness. Princeton UP, Princeton. 
 
